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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARL WINSNESS AND ASSOCIATES, A Partnership,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

Case No. 15501

M. J. CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS,
INC., A Utah Corporation,
DefendantRespondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff against defendant
corporation relating to a lease of a service station in Delle,
Utah.

Plaintiff-lessor alleged that defendant-lessee breached

the leasing agreement by failing to keep the service station
open for 24 hours a day, by incorrectly reporting the number
of gallons pumped in the station during certain months, by
failing to construct a sewage lagoon, by failing to keep the
premises in good repair, and for punitive damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A jury trial commenced in Tooele County on June 14, 1977
before the Honorable Peter F. Leary of the Third Judicial District.

After four days of testimony plaintiff concluded hj.s

case.

Defendant then moved for a directed verdict as to all

five counts.

The court directed a verdict as to the second,

third, fourth, and fifth causes of action and reserved the first
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q
cause of action for later determination.

(Transcript, herein-

after Tr., pp. A-45 to A-47).
Subsequently, the trial court directed a verdict as to
the first cause of action and dismissed the jury.

(Tr., pp.

533-535).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks a new trial as to its first and
third causes of action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 24, 1971 a lease was entered into be~ween Carl
Winsness and Associates, plaintiff-appellant, and M. J. Conoco
Distributors, Inc., defendant-respondent.

(Exhibit, hereinafter

Ex. 5). The lease concerned a service station in Delle, Utah
which is 72 miles east of Wendover and 51 miles west of Salt
Lake.

( Tr . , p • 3 4 ) •
In 1972 a dispute arose between the plaintiff and defen-

An

dant as to the interpretation of this leasing agreement.

action was filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele
County, Civil No.

7761, by plaintiffs asking for certain reme-

dies against defendant.

Plaintiff charged that the defendant

had failed to maintain 24-hour-a-day service, had failed to
pay rent as provided in the contract, and had failed to build
a sewage lagoon as agreed upon in the leasing contract.
After extensive negotiation a stipulation was entered into
between the parties supposedly resolving these issues.
P-6).

(Ex.

The stipulation was signed on April 5, 1974 and a judg-

ment was entered in accordance with the stipulation by the
Honorable Gordon Hall on April 22, 1974.

(Ex. P-7).
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Approximately 1-1/2 years after the stipulation and judgment had been entered in the previous action plaintiff was forced
to file the present action.

Basically the same complaints were

repeated in plaintiff's initial four causes of action.

The first

cause alleged that defendant had breached its rental agreement
by failing to maintain the station on a 24-hour basis and that
because plaintiff was to be paid rent based upon the number of
gallons sold at the station that plaintiff had suffered a financial loss of not less than $20,000.
The second cause of action demanded an accounting of the
number of gallons sold during the period based upon information
and belief that incorrect amounts were being reported to the
plaintiff.

The third cause of action alleged damages for fail-

ure to complete a sewage lagoon system as provided in the stipulated judgment of 1974 and sought damages of $250 a month
for the reasonable rental of a restaurant which could not be
constructed until the lagoon was complete.

Finally, the fourth

cause of action alleged that the service station was not kept
in good repair and that plaintiff was entitled to damages.

{Re-

cord, hereinafter R., pp. 20-1).
An

amended complaint was filed by plaintiff on March 22,

1976 adjusting the amount of damages as to the first four counts
and adding a fifth cause of action for punitive damages alleging that defendant intentionally and willfully violated the
terms of the lease.

{R., pp. 79-76).

On March 30, 1976 defendant filed an answer to the amended
complaint and a counterclaim.

The counterclaim alleged that
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plaintiff interrupted defendant's right of quiet enjoyment of
the premises and also alleged that plaintiff interfered with
defendant's efforts to construct the lagoon.

Finally, defen-

dant sought runilive damages against plaintiff for the alleged
intentional interference and obstruction against defendant.
(R., pp. 81-80).
On February 2, 1977 a preliminary pre-trial order was
made by Judge Peter F. Leary at which time plaintiff's second
cause of action for an accounting was dismissed subject to
amendment.

The pre-trial order also disposed of several mo-

tions made by both parties and requested memoranda as to certain legal issues.

(R., pp. 245-243).

On February 10, 1977 a third amended complaint was filed

by plaintiff extensively revising and clarifying the initial
claims of plaintiff made in the previous two complaints and
amending the second cause of action to a claim for damages resulting from incorrect reporting of gasoline sales.

(R.' pp.

279-271).
On April 4, 1977 a pre-trial order was entered by the
Honorable Peter Leary holding, among other things, that plaintiff's third a.mended complaint could not be filed except as to
the second cause of action and also holding that plaintiff's
third cause of action relating to the failure to complete the
lagoon system incorrectly stated the measure of damages as beir.=
loss of rental from the uncompleted restaurant.

Rather, the

court ruled that the correct measure of damages was the cost
to complete the construction of t.'1e lagoon.

(R., pp. 303-30:
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Subsequently, on May 27, 1977 defendant moved for leave
:o file an amended counterclaim and answer.
AccorGingly,
o~t

(R., pp.

387-381).

the court allowed an amended answer to be filed

denied an amended counterclaim.

(R., p.

389).

On June 14, 1977 a jury trial was commenced before the
Honorable Peter F. Leary at the Tooele County Courthouse.

At

the time of trial five causes of action remained against the
defendant.

The first cause of action claimed that because de-

fendant failed to keep the station open 24 hours as provided
in the original lease agreement and in the prior judgment,
plaintiff was financially damaged in that the rent was dependent upon the number of gallons sold per day.
The second cause of action claimed that defendant had
wrongfully reported the correct number of gallons pumped each
day and therefore plaintiff was damaged by the loss of the correct amount owing under the rental agreement.
The third cause of action was based upon the defendant's
failure to complete the sewage lagoon as required in the lease
agreement and stipulated judgment and for damages in accordance
with the trial court's previous ruling based upon construction
costs.

The fourth cause of action claimed damages for fail-

ing to keep the station in good repair and the fifth cause of
action claimed punitive damages for intentionally and knowingly
violating the lease and the prior judgment of 1974.
Trial was commenced and plaintiff put on numerous wit~esses and offered numerous exhibits in support of these alle-

~at~sns.

Since this appeal primarily rests upon the sufficiency
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of evidence, plaintiff-appellant will not restate the evidence
offered during the trial at this time but will extensively review the evidence as to each cause of action dismissed by the
trial court infra.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence defendant moved
for a directed verdict as to all five counts.

The court granted

a directed verdict as to the fifth cause of action, the fourth
cause of action, the third cause of action, and the second cause
of action.

The court reserved its ruling as to the first cause

of action until further arguments.

(Tr., pp. A-45 to A-47).

On the following day the court directed a verdict as to
the first cause of action stating that there was no clear evidence as to the amount of damage.

(Tr., p. 533) .

The counter-

claim of defendant was dismissed upon stipulation of the parties.

(Tr., p. A-48).
Plaintiff appeals from this directed verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT AS TO COUNTS 1 AND 3 OF PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case the trial court di-

rected a verdict in favor of defendant and against plaintiff
on the basis that no prima facie case had been made by the
plaintiff with regard to the fifth, fourth, third, and second
causes of action.

(Tr., p. A-45).

Subsequently, the court

also directed a verdict as to the first cause of action.
p. 533).
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(Tr.,

Appellant will admit for purposes of this appeal that the
trial court was probably correct in directing a verdict as to
the second cause of action (the alleged incorrect reporting of
gallonage), the fourth cause of action (damage allegedly caused
by disrepair of the station), and the fifth cause of action

(punitive damages).

While there was some evidence as to each

of these allegations it was probably not of a sufficient quantity or quality to merit jury submission.
However, the first cause of action (damages from closure
of the station) and the third cause of action (damage from
failing to complete the lagoon system) were legally sufficient
for submission to the jury and the court committed error in
directing a verdict as to these counts.
This Court in Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d
458 (1962) clearly delineated the standard to be applied in reviewing a directed verdict.

This Court said:

The issue of concern here is whether, reviewing the evidence and all inferences
fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, a prima
facie case . . • was made out. 375 P.2d at
459.
Likewise, in Flynn v.

w.

P. Harlin Construction Company, 29 Utah

2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973) this Court stated that the trial
court should not take a case from a jury where there is any substantial dispute in evidence on issues of fact and that the
court can only do so when the matter is so plain that there is
no conflict in evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ.
The court in Flynn quoted with approval the statement of
Justice Frick in an early decision which said:
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[I]f . . • the court is in doubt whether reasonable men, . . . might arrive at different
conclusions, then this very doubt determines
the question to be one of fact for the jury
and not one of law for the court.
509 P.2d
at 361 citing Newton v. Oregon Short Line
Co., 134 P. 567 (1913).
A review of the evidence in light most favorable to the
plaintiff will show without doubt that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to preclude a directed verdict as to his first
and third causes of action.
A.
There was Ample Evidence to Allow the Jury to Conclude
that a Breach of Contract Occurred by the Closure of the Service
Station and Sufficient Reliable Evidence was Presented to Allow
the Jury to Determine Resulting Damages.
This lawsuit emanated from a service station lease executed on November 24, 1971 between plaintiff, Carl Winsness and
Associates, lessor, and defendant, M. J. Conoco Distributing,
Inc., lessee.

The pertinent provisions of this lease as it re-

lates to the first cause of action are as follows:

First, para-

graph 2 provided a monthly "gallonage rental" of all gasoline
at a rate of $.04 per gallon in the summer and $.02 per gallon
in the winter.

Second, paragraph 19 states that neither party

shall control the other party's business operation but that
"The obligations of the parties are expressly confined to the
performance of the terms and conditions of this lease."

Finally,

paragraph 24 concerned hours of the station:
It is agreed between the parties that the
service station as provided herein shall
be operated on a 24-hour ba~is and shall be
open at all times to the public.
(Ex. P-5)
In 1972 a lawsuit was commenced in Tooele County by plaintiff against defendant on basically the same grounds as the
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present suit.

One contention of plaintiff at that time was

defendant's failure to keep the service station open for the
24-hour period agreed to in the leasing document.

On February

26 and February 27 of 1973 a trial was held before the Honorable Gordon Hall concerning plaintiff's complaint.
38).

(Tr., p.

Before judgment, however, a stipulation was entered into

between the parties and subsequently reduced to a stipulated
judgment.

(Ex. P-6 and P-7).

The judgment signed by Judge Hall provided that the lease
of November 24, 1971 would remain in full force and effect
"except as specifically modified by the Stipulations and Agreements as herein contained".

Because of the gas shortage during

that year and the difficulty in obtaining gasoline from any
source the parties entered into a modification of the 24-hour
provision of the original lease.

The following modification is

contained in the judgment:
It is agreed between the parties that the service station provided herein shall be operated
on a 24-hour basis at all times to the public
except if the following conditions and events
occur.
1.
That the Federal or State or local
governments by law require the closing of the
service station certain hours or days due to
a shortage of petroleum products or to conserve the same or
2.
If gasoline from Continental Oil or
the suppliers for M. J. Conoco, Inc. are on a
quota or allocation basis by virtue of existting government regulations and the quota or
allocation is below the 1972 sales of 452,045
gallons of gasoline for the Delle Service Station, and M. J. Conoco, Inc. providing the
allocation or quota has been sold for the previous and monthly accounting period of the .
lease, can regulate the hours of the operating
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of t~e service station, providing it proportions the allocation or quota of gasoline
for the next month over the number of days
that the_service station can be opened, but
the service station must be open at least 8
hours each day.
The station must be open
each day until the allocation is sold and
if not sold then the station must be open
the next day a sufficient hours and succeeding days until the quota or allocation is
sold.
That in the allocation of gasoline or
petroleum products M. J. Conoco will use its
best effort to obtain petroleum products and
gasoline at all times, and will treat all of
its service stations under the allocation or
quota equally, will apply surplus allocations
or from the closing of other service stations
proportionally to the Delle Service Station
if existing Law and Government Regulations
permit and will treat the Delle Service Station fairly in reference to all other service stations which it services or operates
or distributes petroleum products to.
(Ex.
P-7, PP· 5-6). (Emphasis added).
Thus, the closure of the service station was not a new
question which was raised by plaintiff in the instant case but
had been an ongoing controversy since 1972 and a constant frustration.
Plaintiff offered ample evidence to show that the provision requiring the station to remain open for 24 hours a day
was not being met.

Plaintiff testified that during the month

of May in 1974 he went to Delle, Utah approximately eight times
and found the station closed three of these times mostly on sun··
(Tr., p. 43).

days.

He stated that he contacted Dick Miller,

president of the defendant, who assured him he would correct
the situation.
again.

In June, however, he found the station closed

(Tr., pp.

44-45).

In November of 1974 he met with defendant's officers and
again complained that the station was not open.

Stan Muir, a
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partner in defendant, stated to him, "Fine, we• 11 take care of
it.

You don't have to worry about it."

(Tr., p. 47).

During the Christmas holidays that year plaintiff found
the station closed a number of times including a period of four
consecutive days.

(Tr., p. 48).

In the early part of 1975 he

also found the station closed repeatedly.

(Tr., p. 50).

On January 7, 1975 plaintiff's attorney wrote to Richard
Miller and stated, "We intend to hold you for all damages, for
loss of sales in reference to gasoline and furthermore notify
you that we immediately demand that the service station be kept
open 24 hours a day".

(Ex. P-55).

This letter was followed by

subsequent letters of April 11, 1975 (Ex. P-56) and April 14
(Ex.

P-58).
In March of 1976 plaintiff called Lynn Kirkham who worked

at M. J. Conoco and complained about the station being closed.
(Tr., p. 52).

On March 9, 1976 plaintiff's attorney again

wrote to defendant and stated:
This is to further notify you that my clients
have informed this office that they have never
agreed at any time to allow you not to keep
the station open for 24 hours or waive the 24
hour provision and we have sent notice after
notice to you in reference to this matter.
(Ex. P-60).
.
Finally, a letter was sent August 4, 1976 again reiterating the
terms of the lease and asking for compliance.

(Ex., p. 61).

Plaintiff testified as to various pictures taken throughout the years and how the station was closed in each instance
even when the sign on the door said OPEN.

(See Exhibits P-9,

P-10, P-18, P-19, P-20, P-26, P-28, and P-29; Tr., pp. 54-79).
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Mildred Sims testified that she was the lessee of the
adjoining restaurant and operated it from 1973 until 1976.
(Tr., p. 174).

She stated that initially the restaurant was

kept open for 24 hours but because the station was not kept
continuously open people on the highway could not see the facility from the road and she thus decided to close as she was
doing no business.

(Tr. , p. 177) .

In 1974 Mrs. Sims called Lynn Kirkham herself and reported that the station had been closed for as long as two or
three consecutive days.
about it but didn't.

He told her he would do something

(Tr., p. 179).

She stated that she used

to have a doctor's appointment every Thursday morning and that
many a Thursday morning she would pull into the station and
the station would be closed.

(Tr. , p. 18 3 ) •

In the wintertime she testified that she would be awakenec
constantly by people wanting gas and that she even drained her
own car to help them.

(Tr., p. 185).

Mrs. Sims testified

that many people became angry because the service station was
closed and that she had numerous confrontations during the
three years with upset travelers.

(Tr., pp. 210-211).

Fin-

ally, she stated that while most of her business occurred during the weekends that this was the time when the station was
usually closed.

(Tr. , p . 212 ) .

Pla~ntiff called William Woffinden who had been a highway

patrolman for 10-1/2 years assigned to the Wendover Road.
p. 214).

(Tr.

He stated that the station was hardly ever open on

nightshifts and that on weekends some of the help who were
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hired would leave as soon as the boss drove out of the driveway.

(Tr., p. 222).
The officer further stated that the service station was

closed much of the time before midnight (Tr., p. 234) and that
if the lights of the service station were not on the Delle Complex could not be seen by eastbound freeway traffic.

(Tr., p.

24 3) •

With regard to the gas shortage the officer testified
that in 1974 the traffic was reduced but that at the time of
trial it had picked up to its normal pace and in fact was heavier than ever.

(R., p. 235).

He also stated that a service

station known as "Teddy Bear's Service" in Knolls was doing
its best business that year and he could not see why Delle could
not do the same if the hours were also the same.

(Tr., p. 239).

Myron Baird, vice president of Teddy Bear's Service Station, testified that he frequently went by the service station
during the time period in question and that while it was open
every time during the day it was closed after 8:00 p.m.
Richard Miller, defendant's former president, was called
to testify by plaintiff and stated he remembered being told
twice by plaintiff that the station was not open.

(Tr., p. 413).

He could not remember receiving any of the letters sent by plaintiff's attorney.

(Tr., pp. 416-418).

Jack Woods testified that he worked as a gasoline service
station attendant in the facility between October, 1974 and
March of 1975.

(Tr., p. 435).

He stated that the service sta-

tion was closed about SO per cent of the time when he arrived
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~

for his shift.

(Tr., p. 436).

He further testified that on

Saturdays the station would not be open until about 1:30 p.m.
because of errands he had to run.

(Tr . , p . 4 3 8 ) •

Thus, while it is true that plaintiff did not have a log
showing the operation of the station during each hour of the
disputed period it is clear that the evidence was sufficient
to show that the service station was not being kept open on a
24-hour-a-day basis as provided in the stipulation and lease
agreement.

Although the estimates of the witnesses varied as

to the amount of time the station was actually closed and as
to the days and hours, the jury could have chosen to believe
any, all, or none of the witnesses.

Of course, the jury never

had this opportunity.
As to the amount of damages sustained by the closure,
plaintiff first attempted to introduce Exhibit 35 which was
a breakdown of the number of gallons sold each month in 1972.
Plaintiff testified that during this year the gas station was
open on a 24-hour basis.

(Tr., p. 96).

As will be discussed

infra the trial court committed serious error in failing to
admit Exhibit 35 into evidence since such exhibit provided a
past history of the service station's sales upon which a solid
foundation could be based for an estimation of damages occurring from the early closures.
However, even without this exhibit there was sufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude the amount of damages.

Delbert

Taylor was called by the plaintiffs as an expert witness in
gasoline marketing.

The witness owned his own service sta-
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tions and had worked for several years as a district sales
representative for Husky Oil.

As such, it was his responsi-

bility to investigate marketing potential of various service
station locations and to predict how much money could be made
under varying circumstances.

(Tr., pp. 444-449).

worked in this capacity for eight years.

Mr. Taylor

(Tr., p. 450).

He testified that it was his job to estimate income and
gallonage of existing service stations to see if they were
operating at full capacity.

He stated that his estimates of

gallonage were usually within 2 to 3 per cent of the amount
actually pumped.

(R., p.

450).

He further testified that he had been by the Delle Complex
about 250 times.

In 1971 and again in 1973 his company was in-

terested in placing a station in the vicinity of Delle.

Ac-

cordingly he made projections in both years based upon the Delle
station.
The witness stated that in considering a projection for
gas sales he considered several factors.

The first was the lo-

cation of the station including its nearness to a freeway, its
access, its visibility, and the probability that traffic would
stop there because of its distance from other service stations.
(Tr.

I

p•

452 ) •

The next consideration was the traffic count obtained
from the Utah Highway Department of Transportation.

The wit-

ness studied the Delle traffic volume of 1971, 1973, 1974,
1975, and 1976.

(Tr., pp. 452-453).

The witness stated that
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tion daily.

(Tr., p.

459).

The Department of Transportation

study also showed that there was a definite increase in traffic from 1974 to 1976 with 1974 being slightly less than normal because of the gas shortage.

(Tr., p. 460).

Based upon these studies and his own experience Mr. Taylor
stated that in his estimation there was sufficient traffic to
keep the station open 24 hours a day.

(Tr., p.

462).

He sta-

ted that the location of the station was especially good because cars which had left Elko were beginning to run out of
gas near the Delle station.

(Tr., pp. 465-466).

Finally, the witness stated that based upon all of these
factors and his own personal experience with the location, it
was his opinion that the station would pump three times as
much gas as the present gallonage reported if the station were
to remain open 24 hours a day.

(Tr., pp. 469-470).

He concluded that the sporadic hours testified to by other
witnesses as proposed by plaintiff's counsel in a hypothetical
question would result in a loss of all trucking business and
70 per cent of the potential car business.

(Tr., pp. 469-470).

Taylor estimated that based upon his projections the station
should have been pumping about 90, 000 gallons a month for July,
August, and September.

(Tr., pp. 499-500).

Defendant's attorney on cross-examination attempted to
discredit Mr. Taylor's testimony by probing into a number of
alleged inconsistencies.

(Tr., pp. 471-497).

During the M~

tion for Directed Verdict defendant's counsel argued vigorously
to the court that Mr. Taylor's testimony was not believable
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~d

that it was inconsistent and conflicting.

Defendant's coun-

sel therefore suggested that it be discounted.

(Tr., pp. A-10

to A-14).
Plaintiff's counsel retorted that the testimony of Taylor
was a matter which could be believed or disbelieved by the
jury but that it was a question for the trier-of-fact to decide the credibility of his testimony.

(Tr., p. A-31).

Coun-

sel argued that since defendant was obligated to pay to plaintiff the sum of $.04 per gallon sold during the summer and
$.02 per gallon sold during the winter that the jury had suffibasis to compute damages relying upon the testimony of the witnesses concerning the time of closure and upon the testimony

of Taylor relating to the number of gallons which could have
been pumped had the station been open.

(Tr., pp. A-39 to

A-40).

The trial court in directing the verdict on this cause

of action stated the following:
Now, I know what your argument is, Mr. Duffin,
but it appears to the Court that based on the
testimony that has been presented that if I
submitted the matter to the jury that I would
probably be creating more error than I'm
going to create now, if any; and that is, I'm
going to grant the motion for directed verdict
as to the first cause of action.
I have stewed about this problem and stewed
about this problem, and I just am unable to.
resolve it in my mind. If I can't resolve it,
then I don't know how I can assist the jury
in having them resolve it in their minds.

*

*

*

Now, the court, I suppose, thinks its correct.
But I suppose the Supreme Court will have to
decide that.
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*

*

*

I'm not making my decision, Mr. Duffin without giving it extremely considerable thought.
I'm concerned about it, and it may well be
during some of the matter I have made some
erroneous decisions.
You're left to whatever
remedy you may want, including a motion for
a new trial.
(Tr., pp. 533-535).
The trial court demanded too much from the plaintiff in
requiring exact evidence as to damages.

Aside from having a

24-hour log of the station's activity during the three years
and a competing service station next door to gauge the number
of cars which needed gas, plaintiff did everything possible to
present a reasonable basis for a trier-of-fact to determine
damages.

This Court in Security Development Company v. Fedco,

23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P.2d 706

(1969) held that damages are not

to be denied simply because they cannot be ascertained with
exactness.

"If a reasonable basis of calculation is afforded,

it is sufficient although the result is only approximate."
(462 P.2d at 709).
Likewise, in Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515
P.2d 442

(1973), this Court stated that damages to a business

or enterprise need only be proved with sufficient certainty
that reasonable minds might believe from a preponderance of the
evidence that the damages were actually suffered.
This rule is based upon the assumption that a party who
has broken his contract will not be permitted to escape liability because of the uncertainty in the amount of damages and
the fact that the full extent of damages for breach of contract
must be a matter of speculation is not a ground for refusing
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all damages.

Gould v. Mountain States Te 1 ep h one and Telegraph

company_, 309 P. 2d 802 (Utah 1957).
This Court in the Gould case cited with approval a Virginia case which stated the philosophy behind difficult damages.

That decision said:
Shall the injured parties . . . be allowed to
recover no damages (or merely nominal), because he cannot show the exact amount with
certain~y, though he is ready to show, to
the satisfaction of the jury, that he has
suffered large damages by the injury? Certainly certainty, it is true, would be thus
attained; but it would be the certainty of
injustice . • . . Juries are allowed to act
upon probable and inferential as well as
direct and positive proof. And when from
the nature of the case, the amount of the
damages cannot be estimated with certainty
. . we can see no obJection to placing before the jury all the facts and circumstances of the case having any tendency to show
damages, or their probable amount, so as to
enable them to make the most intelligible
and probable estimate which the nature of
the case will admit.
309 P.2d at 806 (Emphasis supplied in original).

also
-See -

Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. Southern Photo Ma-

terials Co., 273 U.

s.

359 (1927).

Likewise, any inconsistency or failure of Mr. Taylor to
give proper consideration to various factors goes to the weight
of the evidence and not to its admissibility.

As stated by this

Court in the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake Citv v. Matusi
Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974) in speaking about
expert witnesses this Court said:
If he fails to give proper consideration or
weight to any particular factor that ~oe~ .
to the credibility and not to the admissibility of his evidence.
If it has deficienci7s,
they are subject ~o exposure ?n cr?ss.examination and the weight to be given it is for
the jury.
522 P.2d at 1373.
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For these reasons, the trial court erred in concluding
that there was not sufficient evidence to allow the jury to
make a conclusion as to the breach of contract and as to the
damages.

It is ironic that the trial court showed such con-

cern for the uncertainty of damages after depriving the jury
of Exhibit 35 which showed the amount of gallons sold in 1972
during a 24-hour-day operating period.

The court created more

difficulties in already difficult areas by omitting this exhibit as will be discussed infra.
B.
There was Ample Evidence to Allow the Jury to Conclude that a Breach of Contract Occurred by the Failure of
Defendant to Complete the Lagoon System and Sufficient Reliable Evidence was Presente1 to Allow the Jury to Determine
Resulting Damages.
Plaintiff's third cause of action involved a claim based
upon the defendant's failure to complete a functional sewage
lagoon system.

This system was to be used by the plaintiff in

operation of a new restaurant to be built where the footings
had already been poured.

Once again, i t is necessary to exam-

ine the language of the original lease agreement and the subsequent modification in the 1974 judgment.
The lease provided in Section 4-C the following clause:
Sewage.
Lessee shall supervi~e.t~e construction of a septic tank and fac1l1t1es on the
premises of sufficient capacity to serve both
of the respected facilities of the parties.
All maintenance and repair expenses incurred
after installation of the septic tank system
shall be shared equally by the parties hereto.
(Ex. P-5, p. 3).
Testimony at the time of trial showed that even as the lease
·
agreement spoke in
terms o f a "sept1· c tank" it was contemplated
by the parties that a lagoon System

W ould

have to be installed.
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(Tr., pp. 116, 122, 174).

In fact, approval for the lagoon

system had already been made by the State Department of Health
one month before the service station lease was executed.

(Tr.,

p. 252; Ex. P-5).

The stipulated judgment entered in 1974 went into great
detail about the construction of the lagoon:
That Carl Winsness and Associates shall furnish to defendant at no cost an easement and
sufficient land to allow a lagoon system to
be constructed upon the premises of Carl Winsness and Associates at Delle, Utah, said lagoon system is to serve defendant's existing
service station and the new restaurant to be
constructed in the future by Carl Winsness.
Carl Winsness agrees to obtain and deliver,
at his own expense, to defendant a legal description and mutually satisfactory easement
or easements covering the real property underlying the lagoon system and its appurtenant
facilities, said legal description and easements are to be provided by Winsness to defendant upon determination and mutual acceptance
by the parties of a location for the lagoon
system.
It is expressly understood that the
lagoon system is to serve the defendants service station and the new restaurant to be
built by Carl Winsness only and that no other
facilities or improvements will be connected
to said lagoon system except other facilities
mutually agreed upon at the new site, which
will not overload the lagoon system.
3.
The lagoon system provided for under the
terms of this stipulation shall be designed
and constructed at the sole expense and cost
of defendant.
Said lagoon system will be constructed in a square configuration which
square shall be 20 feet wider than the width
of the ponds presently engineered by Nielsen
and Maxwell Engineers.
The lagoon system
shall be designed and constructed to comply
with the rrunimum requirements of the State of
Utah and the County of Tooele. All expenses
and costs of maintenance and operation of the
lagoon system after completion of construction
shall be borne equally by the parties. Each
of the parties shall bear thei: ~w~ costs of
connecting their respected facilities to the
pump bystation.
Sponsored
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That defendant will commence construction of
the lagoon system at Delle, Utah within a
reasonable time after execution of this stipulation and will complete the same within
one year from March 8, 1974, except as may
be excused due to acts of God, or other causes beyond the control of defendant.
(Ex.
P-7).
(Emphasis added).
It was undisputed at trial that the lagoon had not been
finally approved by the Department of Health.

Defendant took

the position that the stipulation and judgment only required
completion of the lagoon facility and not approval by the
Health Department to use it.

(Tr., pp. 403-407).

Various officials from the governing health boards and
sanitation districts testified as to the lagoon system.

Nu-

merous letters from the Division of Health to the defendant
were introduced and received into evidence.

Exhibit P-39 was

the initial approval of the lagoon system dated October 22,
1971.

Exhibit D-36 was a letter dated July 19, 1974 from plain-

tiff's attorney to the Department of Health requesting that he
be notified whether the facility had been approved for operational use.
Defendant's Exhibit 38 is a letter dated August 14, 1974
from the Department of Health to defendant.

The letter states

that an inspection had been made of the premises on August 2,
1974 and that "The inspection has indicated that the treatment
works, as constructed, deviates from the approved plans and
that the existing facility does not comply with the Utah Code
of waste Disposal Regulations".

Defendant was then told to

cease the discharge of waste water in the facility until six
specific items had been completed.

A second letter of the same
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the existing problems.

(Ex. D-37).

On April 21, 1975 an additional letter was sent to defendant by the Division of Health allowing modification of the
original plans and noting deficiencies which still existed before approval could be made.

(Ex. P-46).

On August 26, 1975

a letter was sent from the Division of Health to plaintiff's
attorney stating the following:
In response to your letter to us dated August 20, 1975 inquiring as to the current
status of the above referenced project, Mr.
Miller of M. J. Conoco Distributors, Inc.
has informed us that the project has been
in the finishing stages for some time now,
with completion being delayed only by minor
construction details to be cleared up by
the contractor.
(Emphasis added).
Finally, on May 5, 1976 a letter was sent to defendant by
the Division of Health stating, "As you know, the waste water
facilities as constructed have not yet been approved by this
office due to construction deficiencies".

The letter then lis-

ted five deficiencies or modifications which were still necessary for approval.

(Ex. P-47).

In addition, several pictures were offered into evidence
and received showing the condition of the lagoon pond in May of
1976.

(Ex. P-14, P-15, and P-30).

Plaintiff testified that

he put in the foundation for the new restaurant in 1971.
p. 79; Ex.

31).

(Tr.,

He stated that the restaurant was not construe-

ted because the lagoon system had not been completed by defendant and the restaurant could not have been made operational
until such time.

( Tr . , pp • 81 , 14 0 , 14 2 ) •

Plaintiff stated that he could not afford to invest $60,000

Qf 570,000 in a new restaurant and then not use it because of
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--the unfinished lagoon.

(Tr., p. 113).

He stated that to com-

plete the lagoon would cost $10,000 or $15,000 and that he
didn't feel it was his right to go in and complete the system
when it was the defendant's obligation.

(Tr . , pp . 15 2 -15 3) .

Plaintiff also stated that he was ready, willing, and able at
the time of trial to put in the restaurant when the lagoon was
completed.

(Tr., pp.

81-82).

Art Maxwell, a civil engineer who originally designed the
lagoon system, stated that after its initial design in 1971 he
was not contacted by defendant until March of 1974 when he was
asked to prepare an updated cost estimate of the construction.
It should be noted that this contact occurred one month before
the stipulation and judgment was entered.
An estimate showing three alternatives to finishing the
lagoon system was prepared by Mr. Maxwell and submitted to the
defendant.

(Tr., pp.

259-261; Ex. P-45).

Maxwell stated that

he had examined the ponds recently and determined that they
were not completed according to his plans and specifications.
Mr. Maxwell, based upon the testimony of the Department
of Health officials and the files of the Department of Health,
prepared an estimate as to what it would require to finish the
construction of the lagoon and meet the requirements of the
Division of Health.

(Tr., pp.

348-356; Ex. P-51).

He estimated

the total cost to be $9,300.
This brief summary of plaintiff's evidence shows unquestionably that defendant had failed to complete the lagoon system "to comply with the minimum requirements of the State of
Utah and the County of Tooele" as required in the Stipulation
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and Judgment.
The trial court took the position that since plaintiff
had not built the new restaurant, it had not been damaged by
the failure to complete the lagoon.

(Tr., pp. A-44 to A-45).

Accordingly, the court directed a verdict as to this cause of
action.
The trial court failed to recognize the fact that the
lease, stipulated agreement, and judgment must be considered
as a whole and not segregated into parts.
It is apparent that plaintiff gave up certain considerations and made certain concessions in exchange for those made
by defendant.

It is elementary that where each party has a

legal benefit and legal detriment accruing to it and the contract is signed the contract is supported by legal consideration and that a promise for a promise is adequate legal consideration to support any contract.

Tucson Federal Savings and

Loan Association v. Aetna Investment Corporation, 245 P.2d
423 (Ariz. 1952).
Therefore, defendant was obligated to construct the lagoon just as plaintiff was obligated not to compete with defendant.

(Ex. 5, p. 8).

For the trial court to conclude that

?laintiff suffered no damages because it did not construct the
restaurant is totally erroneous when there is nothing in the
lease agreement making the construction of the lagoon conditional upon the construction of the restaurant.
It is clear that plaintiff was deprived of a constructed
lagoon which had been agreed to by the defendant.

Had the
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plaintiff in the negotiation of the original lease requested
defendant to build a statue of Abraham Lincoln in consideration
for promises and concessions to be made by plaintiff, defendant could not claim that it was not obligated to build such
a statue just because it had no useful purpose to plaintiff.
In effect, the trial court made this determination and complete·
ly ignored the underlying lease agreement and stipulated judgment.
There was competent testimony offered as to the cost of
putting the lagoon in the condition which the defendant had
originally agreed to do by the terms of the lease and judgment.
(Ex. P-51).

The defendant, of course, could question whether

the estimated i terns were actually necessary for "completion"
or could question the date that such estimation would be binding.

But these would be matters for cross-examination and for

defendant's own case to be submitted to the trier of fact for
determination.
The trial court completely ignored the damage evidence by
holding that the failure of plaintiff to build the restaurant
precluded him from making any claim for damages.

The court's

reasoning in taking the matter from the jury was erroneous and
requires reversal.
The trial court erred in directing a verdict as to the
first and third causes of action by failing to allow the jury
to consider the effect that the closure of the station had upon
plaintiff's gallonage income and by failing to allow the jury
to consider the damages caused by the uncompleted lagoon.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EXHIBIT 35 FROM ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE WHEN
IT WAS CLEARLY RELEVANT IN DETERMINING
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES.
Exhibit 35 was an enlarged chart showing the monthly receipts of gasoline for the year, 1972.

A facsimile of this

exhibit is attached for the convenience of the Court as an
Appendix to this brief.
Plaintiff was allowed to introduce into evidence the gallonage reported by defendant for the year 1976 (Exhibit 32),
for the year 1975 (Exhibit 33), and for the year 1974 (Exhibit
34).

Plaintiff testified that during 1972 the station was

operating on a 24-hour-a-day basis and that the traffic conditions were not as good then as they were at the time of trial.
(Tr., p.

96).

Plaintiff then attempted to offer Exhibit 35

into evidence but the court sustained the objection made by
defendant's counsel.

(Tr. , p . 9 7) •

Subsequently, out of the presence of the jury, the following dialogue occurred between counsel and the court:
MR. DUFFIN:
Cornes now the plaintiff, your
Honor, and yesterday offered an exhibit as
to the gallonage sold in . . . 1972.
It was
not for the purpose of showing damages but
to show prior gallonage. Mr. Winsness testified yesterday that the business that he had
came from the west, but there was no difference in the marketing conditions in reference
to the matter than there were at that time.
He further testified they were open in 1972
approximately 24 hours per day.
Now, the
legal question is not for the purpose of damages--! mean not to show that there were any
damages in 1972--but for the purp~se ~f showinq past due sales for the determination of
future profits as discussed in 22 Am.Jur . .
Damages in Section 329.
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ven).
. It goes to the weight of the evidence.
But as to the admissibility, that was
the offer which I made.
THE COURT: Well, the court's opinion is that
the objection should still be sustained.
It's
the court's recollection that based upon the
stipulation all matters prior to the ~ntry of
the judgment in 1974 were--I don't know whether compromised or what, but at least they
were resolved.
So, it would be the court's
position that your basis, any time after 1974
are not prior thereto.
MR. DUFFIN:

I am not offering it--

THE COURT: Well, you could not put in any
evidence of prior earnings or profits.
MR. DUFFIN: Well, the stipulation there wasn't
any stipulation--the stipulation agreement was
there would be no damages for any loss prior to
that time.
I'm not offering it for that purpose.
I'm offering for the purpose of showing
a regular established business which the Supreme
Court said in the Eastman Kodak case
THE COURT:
sustained.

Well, the objection will still be
(R., pp. 133-134).
(Emphasis added).

Plaintiff's counsel then proffered evidence which would
have shown that in 1972 the gallonage sold was in excess of
502, 000 gallons and that conditions were approximately the same
during that time period.

(Tr., p. 134).

Defendant's counsel

responded that conditions were different in 1972 and listed the
factors causing the difference.

Defense counsel then stated:

But quite apart from that, we wish the record
to show that the stipulation is specific and
the trial covered all of these issues previously.
And a stipulation is specific that it
bound the parties and the amount of stated damages which were settled and which were paid and
which has heretofore by the pleadings been admitted to have been received by virtue of these-the change in conditions from 1972 to 1974 is a
part of the stipulation.
(Tr., p. 135).
The stipulation stated the following:
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That Car~ Winsness and Associates and M. J.
Conoco Distrib~tors, In~. hereby mutually
release and waive any rights, claims or causes of action that either party may have or
claim against the other for any alleged
breach of anv of the terms of the written
lease the parties dated the 24th of November
1971 prior to the date of this stipulation. '
(Ex. P 6, pp. 3 4).
(Emphasis added).
The trial court seriously erred when it considered that this
stipulation precluded the use of the 1972 gasoline sales as a
basis for establishing damages in 1974-77 period.
As plaintiff's counsel repeatedly told the court, Exhibit
35 was not meant to claim damages in 1972 but was meant to use

as a comparison for what the station could pump if it were open
on a 24-hour basis.

Defendant's argument that conditions had

changed since 1972 again went to the weight of the evidence
which was a question for the trier-of-fact to consider.
It is fundamental law that evidence of prior profits in
the same business, at least in the case of a business which has
been established and is making a profit when the contract is
breached,

furnishes a basis, together with other facts and cir-

cumstances, for the computation of lost profits, and proof of
such prior profits, or of the income and expenses of the business, for a reasonable time before the interruption charged is
allowable.

22-A C.J.S., Damages, Section 162(4), p. 86.

See

also Mack E. Company v. Pizza of Gaithersburg, 270 A.2d 645
(Md.

1970)

("Loss of profits may be projected from past perfor-

mance, assuming that past performance has continued long enough
to be best evidence of damages which is available"); Western
Rebuilders and Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Felmley, 391 P.2d 383
1

Jre. 1964)

("Past profits may be shown, as basis for recovery
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of future profits, if they reflect operation of established
business").

See also Eastman Kodak Company of New York v.

Southern Photo Materials, 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
This Court in Security Development Company v. Fedco, Inc.
23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P.2d 706 (1969) has held that expert testimony in relation to past history of sales is permissible in
showing damages.

In that case the question was whether or not

the reduction in floor space of a lessee had damaged it by reducing its gross profits.

Evidence was offered as to the gross

sales during a period of several years.

This Court stated:

There was testimony of experts to the effect
that net profits are directly related to
gross profits which in turn are directly
related to gross sales.
The jury, therefore,
had evidence of a proper basis from which
it could have determined that plaintiff's
business was adversely affected by the deprivation of floor space.
462 P.2d at 706.
Thus, the method of using previous business records to establish present damages is accepted as a legitimate method of
proof.

Had Exhibit 35 been introduced into evidence the pla~-

tiff's expert witness, Mr. Taylor, could have given much more
credible testimony based upon the prior history of the business.
In addition, the jurors could have decided for themselves whether the changed conditions as argued by defendants was the
cause of the tremendous decrease in gallonage from 1972 to the
damage period.
The failure of the court to allow Exhibit 35 into evidence
was especially harsh in this situation.

Delle, Utah is an iso·

lated, desolate location where no other service stations operate.
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cords of stations in the vicinity that had 24-hour service
could have been used for damage purposes.

Here, however, the

only sure method of damage computation was based on the station's own history.
The trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding
this exhibit from the evidence.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented by plaintiff when viewed most
favorably clearly establishes a sufficient basis for submitting the first and third causes of action to the jury.

The

evidence was overwhelming that defendant had failed to keep
the service station open on a 24-hour basis in spite of the
previous stipulated judgment in 1974.

There was also suffi-

cient expert testimony correlating the hours of operation with
the number of gallons sold and this testimony together with
the fixed rate of rental per gallon as provided by the lease
agreement would have allowed the jury to determine a damage
figure.
Had Exhibit 35 been admitted into evidence there could be
no doubt that sufficient foundational proof would have been
present for submission to the jury.

The notion of the trial

court that the previous stipulation precluded this evidence was
clear error.

The data was not offered for 1972 damages but

only as a history for 1974-1977 damage comparisons.
Likewise, there was ample evidence that the lagoon had
not been "completed" by any stretch of the imagination and that
t12

stipulated judgment required it be built to the requirements
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of the State authorities.

There was also ample damage evidence

presented as to the completion cost of the lagoon.
The trial court's ruling that plaintiff was precluded
from claiming damages because the new restaurant had not been
built was illogical and erroneous since it ignored the fact
that the parties had made numerous concessions and demands as
a whole and that defendant was therefore obligated to build the
lagoon regardless of plaintiff's future plans for the restaurIn addition, there was nothing in any of the agreements

ant.

making the restaurant a condition precedent to the completion
of the lagoon.
This was not a case where the defendant-lessee was being
sued for breach of the leasing agreement.

It was a case where

defendant had already been sued in 1972 for the exact breaches
and had agreed to rectify these breaches in a stipulated judgment.

The ink was hardly dry on the judgment before defendant

began the same course of conduct.

For the trial court to penal·

ize plaintiff for being unable to prove damages with mathematical certainty or for failing to build the restaurant under
these conditions is both incredible and unjust.
For these reasons, the trial court erred in directing a
verdict as to the first and third causes of action and this
court should remand the matter to the District Court for a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted,
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1972
GALLONAGE AT SERVICE STATION IN DELLE, UTAH
REPORT OF M. J. CONOCO
TO KARL W. WINSNESS & ASSN.

January

15,397

3,198

February

12. 924

3,769

March

14,782

3,458

April

19,591

5,361

May

21,313

4,735

June

29,199

6,966

July

55,156

6,103

August

98,015

3,766

September

97,082

2,300

October

48,494

3' 077

November

25,440

2,162

December

17, 732

1, 692

455,125

46,587

TOTAL

Total gas and Diesel

501, 712

FACSIMILE OF EXHIBIT 35
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

